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JAMES J. BRUDNEY*
The notion that the court that made the ruling which Congress changed
went contrary to a common understanding of what the law meant is
nonsense .... The truth is that the reach of a law may never be appreciated
by the enacting body until it has been passed and put into practice .... That
is why constant legislative reappraisal of statutes as construed by the
courts... is a healthy practice. '
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INTRODUCTION
We are in the midst of an extended debate regarding the proper approach
to construing federal statutes. There have been sharp disagreements over
whether to privilege or discount key interpretive assets generated by our
three branches of government: legislative history, 2 agency or presidential
* Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law. My thanks to Larry Baum, Ruth Colker, Sharon Davies, and
Marc Spindelman for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am grateful to Jordan
Carr and Melanie Oberlin for valuable research assistance and to Jennifer Pursell for
excellent secretarial support. The Moritz College of Law and its Center for
Interdisciplinary Legal Studies contributed generous financial assistance.
'WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 18-19 (Speech at
Centennial of Columbia Law School, 1958).
2 Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 31-37 (1997) (criticizing the use of legislative history), and Alex Kozinski,
Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
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guidance, 3 and the canons of construction. 4 Disputes as to whether these
resources should be viewed as constitutionally legitimate, as pragmatically
reliable, or as unduly politicized have developed into a form of interpretive
branch warfare. 5
.Apart from disagreement among legal scholars, a number of Supreme
Court Justices have engaged in at times heated dialogue addressing the pros
and cons of textualism or intentionalism,6 as well as the virtues and
807, 812-14 (1998) (condemning the misuse of legislative history), with Stephen Breyer,
On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 847-
61 (1992) (promoting the utility of legislative history), and Charles Tiefer, The
Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIs. L. REv. 205,
230-32 (arguing for legislative history as a reasonable guide to Congress's intent).
3 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L.
REv. 823 (2006); Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements,
120 HARv. L. REv. 597 (2006).
4 Compare SCALIA, supra note 2, at 25-29 (defending canons of construction as
effective tools for limiting judicial discretion), and David L. Shapiro, Continuity and
Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 923-47 (1992) (suggesting
that canons promote continuity and neutrality in judicial decision-making), with RICHARD
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 277-82 (1985) (criticizing canons
as imputing an unrealistic omniscience to Congress), and Edward L. Rubin, Modern
Statutes, Loose Canons and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and
Ross, 45 VAND. L. REv. 579, 590 (1992) (arguing that canons "obscure real distinctions,
focus attention on subsidiary issues and conceal or displace normative choices.").
5 In addition to sources cited at notes 2-4, see Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (attacking legislative history); W.
Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112-16 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(defending legislative history); Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or
Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 45-48 (1988) (defending legislative
history); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235-38, 240-56 (2001) (Souter, J.,
and Scalia, J., disagreeing over scope and standards for agency deference); Memorandum
from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to the Litig. Strategy Working Group (Feb. 5, 1986), available at
http://www.archives.gov/news/Samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/accO6O-89-269-box6-
SG-LSWG-Febl986.pdf (defending Presidential signing statements from within Dept. of
Justice); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, 260-61 (1991) (Rehnquist,
J., and Marshall, J., disagreeing over weight and meaning of a key substantive canon).
6 See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993) (Stevens, J., majority,
debating with Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Thomson/Center Arms Co., 504
U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J., majority, debating with Scalia, J., concurring); Wis.
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4 (1991) (White, J., majority,
debating with Scalia, J., concurring).
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limitations of Chevron deference. 7 Justice Ginsburg has remained
substantially removed from these judicial exchanges. Given that she has
authored her share of majority opinions construing federal statutes, her
comparative reticence on matters of interpretive methodology is unusual
although not unique. On occasion, Justice Ginsburg's silence conjures up the
image of a bemused bystander, as when her fellow Justices savage one
another in concurring opinions while her opinion for the Court sails serenely
above that fray. 8
Despite her apparent decision not to articulate a philosophy, Justice
Ginsburg has adopted her own approach to the challenge of interpreting
federal statutes. This Article examines that approach by focusing on four
opinions construing federal criminal statutes and three opinions interpreting
labor relations and anti-discrimination laws. These seven opinions-five
majorities and two dissents-are not offered as an empirically representative
cross-section of Ginsburg's work in the area of statutory interpretation. They
are, however, fairly illustrative 9 of her effort to position the Court as a
participant in an ongoing dialogue with the two other branches.
For Justice Ginsburg, neither textualism nor intentionalism1 ° provides a
dominant orientation. Rather, her reliance on certain interpretive resources
7 See, e.g., Mead Corp., 544 U.S. at 235-38, 240-56 (Souter, J., majority, debating
with Scalia, J., dissenting); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987)
(Stevens, J., majority, debating with Scalia J., concurring); Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576, 591 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring, debating with Breyer, J., dissenting).
8 See Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 270-75
(Ginsburg, J., majority); id. at 276-78 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 279-81 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
9 Justice Ginsburg authored over 125 majority opinions and 80 dissents during her
first fifteen years on the Court, from the 1993 through the 2007 Terms. Of her majorities
construing substantive statutory language, I have identified nine that addressed federal
criminal or sentencing provisions and ten that involved interpretation of labor relations or
civil rights laws. I chose to analyze majorities and dissents in which Ginsburg was
reasonably explicit about her adoption or rejection of interpretive resources. For other
criminal law majority opinions in which Ginsburg relies heavily on text and canons, see
Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23 (1997); Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007).
For other civil rights opinions in which Ginsburg relies heavily on legislative history
and/or agency deference, see Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002); Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10 Textualist judges and scholars contend that courts should devote their energies to
analyzing and explaining the language enacted into law and should avoid reliance on the
unenacted intentions expressed by various congressional subgroups. See John F.
Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 33,
36-41 (2006). Intentionalist judges and scholars maintain that statutes are the end product
of a complex communicative process, and that courts should seek to discern and apply
the intent expressed by key legislative subgroups during that process in order to clarify or
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varies depending on how she views the Court's role as an interstitial actor. In
the criminal law area, Ginsburg opinions make primary use of language-
based analysis and of two substantive canons that operate to constrain the
scope of text, while downplaying contextual evidence of congressional or
Executive Branch intent. By contrast, her labor and anti-discrimination
opinions-although they begin with textual analysis-rely heavily on
legislative history and purpose as well as on agency deference. Such notable
differences in interpretive approach may reflect in part Justice Ginsburg's
underlying policy preferences. A more important lesson of these opinions,
though, is how they reflect her view of the Court's appropriate institutional
interaction with the political branches.
When construing the meaning and scope of criminal law statutes, Justice
Ginsburg advances a fairly muscular institutional role for the Court. She
relies on close textual readings combined with judicial policy norms like the
rule of lenity and the anti-preemption canon to shape an interpretive dialogue
with Congress and the Executive. Her position may well signify both a
constitutionally informed 1 policy concern for the powerless position of
criminal defendants in regular political discourse and an expectation that the
political branches are quite capable of producing effective responses to
criminal law majority opinions with which they disagree. But when it comes
to labor relations and civil rights, Ginsburg seems to regard the Court as a
more junior partner in the lawmaking enterprise. Her willingness to rely on
contextual resources produced by Congress and the Executive suggests a
level of deference to these branches that is missing from her interpretive
approach in criminal law. This more deferential stance may in turn signal
both a greater comfort level about how interest group politics operate in a
civil regulatory setting and greater skepticism regarding Congress's ability to
correct or respond to any constraining constructions imposed by the Court.
Part I of this Article addresses Justice Ginsburg's approach in criminal
law, focusing on her majority opinions in Ratzlaf v. United States, 12
Cleveland v. United States,13 and Jones v. United States,14 and her dissenting
opinion in Muscarello v. United States.15 Part II discusses the Ginsburg
amplify inconclusive text. See James J. Brudney, Intentionalism's Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 1001, 1004-12 (2007).
11 See generally John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction
of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 202-21 (1985) (discussing separation of powers,
notice, and rule of law justifications for relatively strict interpretation of criminal
statutes).
12 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
13 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
14 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
15 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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approach in labor and civil rights law, as illustrated by her dissent in NLRB v.
Health Care & Retirement Corp.,16 her majority opinion in Holly Farms
Corp. v. NLRB, 17 and her majority opinion in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring.18 Part III attempts to reconcile these quite distinct methodological
approaches by invoking Ginsburg's view of the Court as an interstitial actor
in our separation-of-powers scheme.
I. CRIMINAL LAW: ROBUST JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT
Ratzlaf v. United States,19 decided during Justice Ginsburg's initial
Term, presented the issue of what the government must prove to convict an
individual of "willfully violating" the anti-structuring provision of the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986.20 Acting pursuant to a 1970 statute, the
Secretary of the Treasury had required financial institutions to report
currency transactions of more than $10,000.21 In an effort to deter
circumvention of this mandate, Congress in 1986 prohibited any person from
structuring a financial transaction "for the purpose of evading the reporting
requirements" of the earlier statute,22 and also specified criminal penalties for
anyone "willfully violating" the new prohibition on structuring.23 Ratzlaf had
paid off $160,000 in gambling debts by purchasing cashiers' checks for just
under $10,000 from a series of banks. He admitted this was no accident: he
had intentionally structured the cash transactions for the purpose of avoiding
the banks' obligation to report them, but he denied knowing that his own
structuring activity was unlawful.24
The Supreme Court reversed Ratzlaf's conviction and in doing so
rejected the approach taken by ten circuits that had addressed this issue.25
Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Ginsburg held there could be no
conviction unless a jury finds that the person who structured the transaction
16 511 U.S. 571, 584 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
17 517 U.S. 392 (1996).
18 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
19 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
20 Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, subtit. H, § 1354, 100 Stat. 3207-22 (1986) (codified at
31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2006)); see also 510 U.S. at 139-40.
21 See 510 U.S. at 138-39.
22 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2006); see 510 U.S. at 139-40.
23 See 510 U.S. at 140.
24 See id. at 137-38.
25 See id. at 152-53 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing to cases from ten
circuits and observing that the only circuit to have come out differently allowed "reckless
disregard" of the anti-structuring requirements to support a conviction).
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had specific knowledge that structuring itself was illegal, not simply that
evading the banks' reporting requirements was unlawful activity. 26 Ginsburg
relied heavily on the textual integrity canon27 to avoid interpretations that
render certain words or phrases as surplusage. She reasoned that under the
government's approach, the phrase "willfully violating" would have added
nothing to the offense because conviction required no more than proof of the
first scienter requirement in the law-a "purpose of evading the reporting
requirements." 28 Further, the government's position might criminalize
currency structuring that was "not inevitably nefarious," such as a small
business keeping deposits below $10,000 to avoid the burdens of an IRS
audit or an individual reducing deposits to keep his wealth status secret from
a former spouse. 29
Justice Ginsburg concluded that because the text was so clear, she would
not resort to legislative history to "cloud" the Court's textual analysis. 30
Importantly, she also observed that even if the "willfulness" requirement
were ambiguous, principles of lenity would compel resolution in favor of the
defendant. 31
The majority analysis in Ratzlaf was hotly contested. Justice Blackmun
in dissent contended that the term "willful" in criminal law was commonly
used less restrictively than the majority suggested, and at a minimum the text
was therefore ambiguous.32 Blackmun's review of the legislative history
provided strong evidence that Congress in 1986 meant to criminalize
individual behavior like Ratzlaf's-and that Congress was not even aware of,
much less worried about, any need for a second scienter showing.33 The
dissent relied in its analysis on two committee reports and also on hearing
testimony from the Deputy Attorney General. 34
The Ratzlaf decision was questioned by criminal law practitioners and
academics as well as legislation scholars.35 It also drew fire from Congress,
26 See id. at 140-49.
27 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION app.
B, at 21 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing textual integrity canon, or the Whole Act Rule).
28 510 U.S. at 140-41.
29 Id. at 144-45.
30 Id. at 147-48.
31 Id. at 148-49.
3 2 1d. at 151-56.
33 See id. at 157-59.
34 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 158-59 & n.10.
35 See Kathryn Keneally, Supreme Court Raises "Specific Intent" Threshold for
Some Criminal Violations, 81 J. TAX'N 44, 47 (1994) (questions from litigator); Sharon
L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable
[Vol. 70:4
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which overrode the Court within months as part of a larger statute regulating
banking practices. 36 Although judges-like the rest of us-do not necessarily
embrace criticism, I doubt that Justice Ginsburg was overly disturbed by
Congress's prompt, business-like reaction. Having invoked Justice Holmes'
gloss on the rule of lenity-that "legislatures and not courts should define
criminal activity" 37-- Ginsburg may have anticipated that Congress would
act to vindicate the Justice Department's position by expressing more clearly
its legislative policy preference. The speed of Congress's response, however,
may have educated the new Justice to expect that in future instances,
Congress might be prepared to clarify its intent on criminal enforcement in
response to Court interpretations it views as unduly restrictive.
In Cleveland v. United States,38 another white collar crime case decided
seven terms later, the issue was whether defendants who made false
statements when applying for a Louisiana state license to operate video poker
machines had deprived the state of "property" within the meaning of the
federal mail fraud statute. 39 That statute prohibits use of the mails to further
"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses."40 Justice Ginsburg, for a unanimous
Court, held that issuance of a state license was not a relinquishment of
"property" under the federal law.4 1
The Court relied heavily on the analysis of "property" it had set forth
over a decade earlier in McNally v. United States.42 The Court in McNally
held that patronage schemes depriving citizens of their intangible right to
honest services were not covered under Section 1341 as deprivations of
property.43 Justice Ginsburg recognized that Congress had partially
Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 374-81 (1998) (questions from criminal law scholar);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 58-60 (1994) (questions from
legislation scholars).
36 See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (1994). For evidence that Congress was acting
to override Ratzlaf, see, for example, H.R. REP. No. 103-438, at 13, 22 (1994); 140
CONG. REc. 5572 (1994) (statement of Rep. Neal).
37 510 U.S. at 148-49 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)
(Holmes, J.)).
38 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
39 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
40 Id. (emphasis added).
41 See Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 18-27.
42 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
43 Id. at 356-60.
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overridden McNally the following year,44 by specifying that a "scheme or
artifice to defraud" includes a scheme or artifice to deprive someone of the
intangible right to honest services. 45 But she viewed it as "significant" that
Congress addressed only this intangible right, and did not otherwise question
the McNally Court's reasoning that Section 1341 was limited to depriving
someone of proceeds in money or property.46 Ginsburg went on to determine
that Louisiana did not part with any "property" when issuing a license.
Rejecting various arguments from the Department of Justice, she concluded
that the state's interests in this licensing setting were regulatory as part of its
ordinary exercise of police powers.47
In addition to reiterating the Court's prior textual analysis focused on
traditional concepts of "property," Justice Ginsburg invoked two substantive
canons in support of the Court's construction. She again relied on the rule of
lenity, emphasizing that any ambiguity as to the meaning of the word
"property" should be resolved against the government.48 She also invoked
the anti-preemption canon and its special applicability in the traditionally
state law area of criminal enforcement, reasoning that the Court should not
"approve a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction in the
absence of a clear statement by Congress." 49 Relatedly, the majority, aware
of Congress's response to the Court's prior interpretation of this same statute,
effectively invited further institutional dialogue: "Again, as we said in
McNally, if Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it
has." 50
Justice Ginsburg in Cleveland anticipates with apparent equanimity the
prospect of an override by Congress. She recognizes that Congress overrode
the Court on this very provision in McNally, and she also is aware that
Congress overrode her own narrowing construction of a separate criminal
provision in Ratzlaf 51 Her composed stance echoes that of Justice White,
whose seat she filled on the Court, and whose memorandum to the
Conference accompanying the McNally opinion remarked on the "saving
grace in statutory construction cases... that Congress may have its way if it
44 See Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 19-20.
45 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181,
4508 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
46 Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 19-20.
47 Id. at 20-24.
48 See id. at 25.
4 9 Id. at 24.
50 Id. at 20 (internal quotations omitted).
51 See supra text accompanying note 36.
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does not like the product of our work. '52 Although Congress has not yet
taken action in Cleveland, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a
bipartisan bill in the last Congress that would have overridden the Court's
holding 53 and a similar bill was introduced at the start of the current
Congress.54
The third Ginsburg majority opinion construing a federal criminal statute
is Jones v. United States,55 which involved the crime of arson. The defendant
was convicted under the federal arson statute for throwing a Molotov cocktail
into a private residence in Indiana. 56 The court of appeals accepted the
Justice Department's jurisdictional argument that this home was "used in
interstate commerce" under the statute because the home served as collateral
to obtain a mortgage from an out-of-state lender, it was insured by an out-of-
state company, and it received natural gas from out-of-state sources.57
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg reversed the conviction: she
construed "used" to require that a private residence be actively employed as
part of a commercial venture, not simply serve as a passive conduit for
various commercial contacts. 58
Ginsburg once again relied on a close textual reading. She invoked the
ordinary meaning of the word "used" as having an active connotation.59 She
also relied on the presumption against surplusage, reasoning that because
interstate energy sources are consumed in virtually all American homes, the
additional limiting language included in the statutory provision would have
no meaning under the government's argument. 60
52 See Memorandum of Justice White, on file in The Thurgood Marshall Papers,
Library of Cong., Madison Bldg., box 423, folder 3, Nos. 86-234 and 86-286 (regarding
McNally), quoted in ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 27, at 900.
53 See S. 1946, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) (introduced by Sens. Leahy, Comyn, and
Sessions); S. REP. No. 110-239, at 8 (2007) (explaining how bill would override
Cleveland holding).
54 See 155 CONG. REC. S56-57 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy
discussing S. 49, § 3, introduced by Sens. Leahy and Comyn).
55 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
56 See id. at 851. The statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006), criminalizes
malicious damage or destruction, by means of fire or explosives, of "any
building ... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate
or foreign commerce."
57 See 529 U.S. at 855.
58 See id at 852-59.
59 See id. at 855-56.
60 See id. at 857 (referring to requirement that building be used in any commerce-
affecting activity).
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As in Ratzlaf and Cleveland, the Court in Jones concluded that the text
was unambiguous-despite an even split among the six circuits to have
addressed this issue. 61 And as in her earlier majorities, Justice Ginsburg went
on to conclude that her textual analysis was "additionally reinforced by other
interpretive guides." 62 She invoked both the rule of lenity and the
presumption against altering the traditional federal-state balance in criminal
law to emphasize that even if the language were ambiguous, it should be
construed against the Department of Justice. 63
In a brief concurrence, Justice Stevens praised the majority's reasoning
while noting that the defendant's criminal offense under state law would
have resulted in a far shorter period of imprisonment than he had received
from the federal trial court. 64 Stevens then reiterated the majority's implicit
invitation to Congress to speak more clearly if it wished to federalize this
conduct traditionally regulated by the states. 65
The final criminal law decision, Muscarello v. United States,66 features
Justice Ginsburg writing a dissent. The case dealt with the enhanced prison
sentence that attaches to carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense.
The issue presented was whether the phrase "carries a firearm" triggered a
mandatory sentence when the defendant knowingly placed a gun in his glove
compartment for protection in relation to the drug offense, or only if the
defendant had been carrying a firearm on his person while committing the
crime. 67 The Court ruled five-to-four for the broader meaning of "carries"
urged by the government; Justice Ginsburg spoke for the four dissenters.68
61 See id. at 852 n.2 (listing three circuits on each side). In this instance, as in
Ratzlaf Justice Ginsburg seemed comfortable insisting on an absence of ambiguity in the
face of substantial appellate court analysis to the contrary. Cf Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99
(Scalia, J., majority) (insisting that statutory language was plain and unambiguous and
therefore legislative history was irrelevant); id. at 112-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority for "put[ting] on its thick grammarian's spectacles and ignor[ing] the
available evidence of congressional purpose.").
62 529 U.S. at 858.
63 See id. Ginsburg also invoked the canon of avoiding constitutional questions,
referencing the Court's recent Lopez decision that identified limits on the reach of
Congress's Commerce Clause jurisdiction. See id. at 857-58. But given that Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens (who concurred here) were Lopez dissenters, this unanimous
opinion is best understood as a statutory construction decision. See also id. at 860
(Thomas, J., concurring) (reserving constitutional questions about arson statute).
64 See id. at 859 (comparing ten years for state offense with thirty-five years for
federal offense).
65 See id. at 859-60.
66 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
67 See id. at 126-27.
68 See id. at 139-50.
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Justices Breyer (for the majority) and Ginsburg disagreed with respect to
a wide array of interpretive resources. On the ordinary and dictionary
meanings of "carries," each side made respectable arguments and one could
infer that the word itself was somewhat ambiguous in this setting.69 With
respect to legislative history and purpose, though, the majority had the
stronger position. Justice Breyer relied on floor statements from several
House members including the bill's chief sponsor that the provision sought
"to persuade a man who is tempted to commit a federal felony to leave his
gun at home."70 The majority also invoked a number of additional statements
indicating that members understood the word "carries" to have a scope well
beyond bearing a gun on one's person. 71 Justice Ginsburg's effort to rebut
the majority's legislative history arguments was brief and not overly
persuasive. 72 Moreover, the specific legislative history relied on by the
majority comported with the statute's broader purpose, previously described
by the Court as "an effort to combat the dangerous combination of drugs and
guns."73
Of special interest is the debate in Muscarello between the majority and
dissent regarding the rule of lenity. For Justice Breyer, most penal statutes
contain some ambiguity, but principles of lenity do not come into play in the
vast majority of such cases. Rather, the rule applies only as a tiebreaker in
instances of "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty" where a court "can make no
more than a guess as to what Congress intended. '74 By contrast, Justice
Ginsburg regards the rule of lenity as a presumption, not merely a tiebreaker.
Unless the text, structure, and legislative history "establish that the
Government's position is unambiguously correct," courts must resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the criminal defendant. 75
Putting aside differences between majority and dissent as to whether the
ambiguity in Muscarello is run-of-the-mill or grievously exceptional, what
stands out is Justice Ginsburg's insistence that the rule of lenity shifts the
69 Compare id. at 127-31 (majority reliance on definitions from five dictionaries and
ordinary usage examples from inter alia King James Bible and Herman Melville), with
id. at 142-45 (dissent reliance on definitions from two dictionaries and ordinary usage
examples from inter alia King James Bible, Rudyard Kipling, and Theodore Roosevelt).
70Id. at 132 (quoting remarks of Rep. Poff and two other House supporters)
(emphasis added).
71 See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 133-34 (relying on remarks from six House
members).
72 See id. at 148 n.12.
73 See id. at 132 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
74 Id. at 138-39 (internal citations omitted).
75 Id. at 148 (internal citations omitted).
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burden of clarity to the political branches. Under the Ginsburg approach,
there can be no prosecution when even a modicum of ambiguity exists in a
criminal statute. Imposing on Congress the obligation to be "decisively
clear" 76 in text is appropriate because Congress-supported by the
Executive-is in a relatively strong position to modify or override the
Court's construction. Indeed Congress had recently overridden the Court's
restrictive interpretation of the phrase "uses a firearm" in this same sentence-
enhancement provision.77
The four criminal law cases summarized above construe two statutory
provisions covering white collar crime and two that address more traditional
street crime. Justice Ginsburg's interpretive stance favoring the criminal
defendant in each decision is consistent with her broader ideological
orientation toward the rights and interests of society's disadvantaged or
dispossessed.78 Pro-defendant outcomes, however, are hardly Ginsburg's
uniform position when authoring opinions that construe federal criminal
statutes. 79 At the same time, Ginsburg applies her reliance on close textual
analyses plus constitutionally grounded substantive canons equally to white
collar defendants and those accused of street crimes. The fact that her
interpretive approach yields pro-defendant outcomes in all four decisions is
intriguing, given that many other Justices-liberal and conservative-vote
very differently when it comes to white collar as opposed to non-white collar
criminal cases.80 Moreover, the distribution of Justices in these four cases
does not mirror traditional liberal-conservative fault lines.81
76 Id.
77 See Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)). The 1998 statute overrode the Court's unanimous decision in Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). See H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 6 (1997).
78 See generally Deborah Jones Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's Jurisprudence of Opportunity and Equality, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 39 (2004).
79 See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007) (majority opinion affirming
enhanced sentence based on statutory analysis); Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001)
(majority opinion affirming denial of sentence reduction based on statutory analysis);
Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23 (1997) (majority opinion affirming criminal
conviction based on statutory analysis).
80 See J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 1199, 1217, 1229-30 (1999) (reporting that for Supreme Court criminal law
decisions from 1971 to 1994, Justices Brennan and Marshall voted for defendants far less
often in white collar criminal cases, while Justices O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and
Scalia voted for defendants far more often in white collar criminal cases-for Chief
Justice Rehnquist the difference was 62% v. 8% and for Justice Scalia it was 82% v. 7%);
Lawrence Baum & Wendy Watson, Policy Preferences and Social Interests in the
Supreme Court: Voting in Criminal Cases 14, 15-18 (Sept. 27, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (reporting that in criminal cases from 1975 to 1985,
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Apart from any ideological explanation, Justice Ginsburg's reliance on
close textual readings, her discounting of legislative history, and her
emphasis on two key substantive canons likely reflect the presence of strong
institutional considerations. In this criminal law setting, Ginsburg turns to
judicial policy norms disfavoring overzealous prosecution and the
federalization of what she regards as a traditionally state law field. These two
substantive canons play a central role in the Court's ongoing conversation
with Congress and the Executive on matters of statutory interpretation.
Invoking one or both of these canons in each of her four opinions, Justice
Ginsburg effectively invites Congress to respond by clarifying its policy
preferences. She seems convinced-based on the recent legislative track
record in this area-that Congress will do so if in fact it wants to expand the
scope of federal criminal jurisdiction and the extent of defendants' exposure
to federal prosecution.
II. LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS: DEFERENCE TO THE POLITICAL
BRANCHES
Justice Ginsburg has been centrally involved in two decisions
interpreting provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).82
In NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.,83 decided during her first Term
on the Court, the issue was how broadly to construe the supervisory
employee exemption from NLRA coverage. Four licensed practical nurses at
a nursing home were responsible for monitoring and directing the work of
aides on evenings and weekends in the interest of residents' care and well-
being. 84 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) held that
these four nurses were covered employees rather than excluded supervisors
liberal Justices were less favorable toward business defendants than toward "ordinary"
criminal defendants while conservative Justices were more favorable).
81 Two decisions-Cleveland and Jones-are unanimous, but the Senate Judiciary
Committee views Cleveland as overly liberal (see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying
text) while a number of legal scholars regard Jones as distinctly conservative. See, e.g.,
Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 573,
583-86 (2004); George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate:
Morrison, Jones, and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 983, 1009-11. As for the two closely
divided decisions, Justice Ginsburg is joined in Ratzlaf by two liberals (Justices Stevens
and Souter) and two conservatives (Justices Kennedy and Scalia), and in Muscarello her
dissent is joined by one liberal (Justice Souter) and two conservatives (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia).
82 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000). I use the term "NLRA" to refer to the original 1935
statute as amended in 1947 and 1959.
83 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
84 See id. at 574-75.
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under the Act.85 The Supreme Court rejected the Board's position by a five-
to-four vote; Justice Ginsburg authored the dissent.86
Justice Kennedy for the majority concluded that the Board's well-settled
interpretation of the definition of "supervisor" was at odds with the plain
language of the Act. The definition encompasses individuals with authority
"in the interest of the employer" to hire, discipline, discharge, or responsibly
direct other employees. 87 The Board had long viewed this phrase as covering
the interests of the employer in terms of personnel relations but not
professional performance. 88 For the majority, the ordinary meaning of the
phrase was much broader-it included all acts by an employee "within the
scope of employment or on the authorized business of the employer. '" 89
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that this broad reading of excluded
supervisors might create tension with the Act's inclusion of professionals as
employees, but he dismissed the Board's effort to resolve that tension as a
distortion of the statutory language. 90 The majority also discounted any effort
to rely on the Act's legislative history, characterizing the committee report
language invoked by the Board as isolated and without authority.91
Justice Ginsburg's dissent relied heavily on the views expressed by the
two other branches. She found the textual definition of "supervisor" clearly
relevant but ultimately insufficient given the tension between Congress's
exclusion of supervisors and its simultaneous inclusion of professionals. 92
Congress had added the exclusion of supervisors in 1947 to override a
Supreme Court decision that deemed them to be covered employees absent
express language to the contrary.93 Justice Ginsburg paid close attention to
the legislative history accompanying this 1947 language; she found that
several documents reflected an intent to limit the scope of the new exclusion
to front line managers who had the right to hire, fire, discipline, or effectively
to recommend such actions. 94 Relatedly, Ginsburg emphasized that Congress
had added protection for professionals as part of the same statutory changes,
85 See id. at 575.
86 See id. at 584-99.
87 See id. at 573 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)).
88 See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 574.
89 Id. at 578.
90 See id. at 581.
91 See id. at 581-82.
92 See id. at 584-85.
93 See id. at 586-87.
94See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 587-88 & n.4, 589, 595 n.14 (relying on Senate
committee report, Conference report, and floor statement from leading House supporter).
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and this addition necessarily tempered the scope of the supervisor
definition. 95
Justice Ginsburg also observed that over a twenty-year period, the NLRB
had harmonized Congress's twin policies-including professionals while
excluding supervisors-through a series of decisions covering a wide array
of white collar employees.96 She found the Board's line of decisions,
including this one, to be fully rational and consistent with the Act and
therefore deserving of deference.97 Ginsburg's dissent warned that the
majority opinion would have substantial implications, excluding virtually all
professionals from the Act's protections. 98 She regarded this holding as
indefensible largely because it undermined the policy positions adopted by
Congress and the Executive.
The decision in Health Care was highly controversial; it has been
sharply criticized by scholars and practitioners as well as labor unions.99 The
Court has reinforced its holding since 1994, further limiting coverage of
health care professionals in a closely divided decision.100 Thirteen years after
Health Care, a bill was introduced to override the Court's ruling, but the
proposal made little progress101 and future prospects for such labor law
reform are far from promising. 102
95 See id. at 588.
96 See id. at 589-92 (discussing Board decisions concerning supervisory status of
inter alia doctors, pharmacists, librarians, social workers, architects, and engineers).
97 See id. at 590-92, 598-99.
98 See id. at 598-99.
99 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLuM. L. REv.
749, 758-59 (1995) (criticism from legal scholar); Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint for
Reform of the National Labor Relations Act, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517, 558-60 (1994)
(same); Joseph R. Grodin, Report on the 1993-94 Supreme Court Labor and Employment
Law Term, 10 LAB. LAW. 693, 697-99 (same); Edwin A. Keller, Jr., Death by
Textualism: The NLRB's "Incidental to Patient Care" Supervisory Status Test for
Charge Nurses, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 576, 599-617 (criticism from legal practitioner); AFL-
CIO, Employers Spar Over Reform of Labor Laws Before Dunlop Commission, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-25 (Sept. 9, 1994) (criticism by Lewis Maltby of National Task
Force on Civil Liberties in the Workplace); ANA Convention Calls for Legislation to
Overturn Supreme Court Decision, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-23 (June 23, 1994)
(criticism from American Nurses Association).
100 See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001). The Bush Labor
Board recently applied the lessons of Health Care and Kentucky River to restrict
coverage of nurses in particular settings. See Oakwood Health Care, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B.
686 (2006).
101 See H.R. 1644, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 969, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced
Mar. 22, 2007). These identically worded bills would have modified the definition of
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Justice Ginsburg's second contribution to NLRA jurisprudence, Holly
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 10 3 came down two Terms later. This case also
involved a coverage issue-whether the Act's exemption for agricultural
laborers applied to individuals who collect for slaughter chickens raised by
independent "growers" and transport the chickens to their employer's food-
processing plant.104 Writing for the majority in another five-to-four case,
Ginsburg ruled that these workers were covered employees rather than
exempt agricultural laborers. 105
The Court began by observing that the NLRA contained no definition of
"agricultural laborer." 10 6 Congress had long instructed the Board to rely on
the definition of "agriculture" in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a
definition that included considerable detail and specificity. 10 7 But Justice
Ginsburg found the FLSA definition and the Department of Labor's
implementing regulations to be inconclusive in this setting. 108
Her analysis turned instead to the legislative history accompanying
Congress's 1946 determination that "agricultural laborer" should be linked to
the FLSA definition. She noted that the initial House version had
incorporated a broad definition borrowed from the Social Security Act, but
"supervisor" to require that an employee must spend the majority of her time in a
supervisory capacity; they also proposed to delete the phrase "responsibly to direct" from
the definition. For evidence that the bills' intent was to override Health Care and its
progeny, see Are NLRB and Court Rulings Misclassifying Skilled and Professional
Employees as Supervisors?: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health, Employment,
Labor and Pensions to Consider H.R. 1644, the ReEmpowerment of Skilled and
Professional Employees and Construction Tradesworkers (RESPECT) Act, 110th Cong.
9-16 (2007) (testimony of Sarah M. Fox); 153 Cong. Rec. S3615 (daily ed. Mar. 22,
2007) (remarks of Sen. Dodd). A review of the Bill Summary and Status for H.R. 1644 at
the Library of Congress's Thomas Website (http://thomas.loc.gov), carried out on
October 22, 2008, indicates that the House bill was reported out of committee on a
straight party line vote in September 2007, but that no committee report was ever filed
and no floor action scheduled. The office of Rep. Robert E. Andrews, chief sponsor of
H.R. 1644, confirmed that the bill passed out of committee with no report. Interview by
Melanie Oberlin, Library Reference Specialist at Moritz College of Law, with
congressional aide to Rep. Andrews (Oct. 22, 2008). The Senate bill was referred to
committee; no action was ever taken.
102 Congress has not amended the NLRA in any substantial way for fifty years. See
infra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing congressional gridlock).
103 517 U.S. 392 (1996).
104 See id. at 394-95.
105 See id. at 397-409.
106 See id. at 397.
107 See id. at 397-98 (discussing annual riders to Appropriations Acts for the NLRB
and quoting definition from 29 U.S.C. § 203(0).
108 See Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 405-06.
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lawmakers in the Senate objected that this would exclude a large number of
food processing employees. 10 9 The final version adopted in Conference
substituted the "much narrower definition" provided under the FLSA.I10 For
Justice Ginsburg, this legislative history established that the agricultural
laborer exemption was targeted to the family-size farm rather than to
industrial-scale agribusiness operations. In addition, the legislative history
supported the Act's overall purpose of offering basic protections to private
sector employees by avoiding unduly expansive interpretations of a statutory
exemption. "11
Justice Ginsburg then proceeded to explain at some length why the
Board's position-that these live-haul activities undertaken as part of
chicken-processing were not "incident to or in conjunction with... farming
operations"' '12-was a reasonable construction of the statute even if it might
not be the best interpretation. 113 She considered the employer's arguments
plausible in several respects, but she placed considerable weight on the
agency's longstanding consistent approach to vertically integrated poultry
production. 114 In the end, the Board's factual determinations had sufficient
basis in the record, and its textual interpretations were sufficiently defensible,
to qualify as reasonable and hence deserving of affirmance."15 Justice
Ginsburg's analysis was disputed by the four dissenting Justices, for whom
the FLSA definition unambiguously established that most of the employees
in this instance were performing agricultural work. 116 The dissent saw no
basis for relying on either legislative history or agency deference given the
clarity of controlling text. 1 7
Although the poultry-processing industry was not happy with the Court's
ruling,"18 Holly Farms has generated little discussion."l 9 Members of
109 See id. at 399 n.6.
I 10 See id. (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 402 n.8 (discussing legislative
history accompanying the language of FLSA definition).
I I I See id. at 399 & n.6.
112 See id. at 398 (quoting from FLSA definition of "agriculture").
113 See Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 399-408.
114 See id. at 401-05.
115 See id. at 404-09.
116 See id. at 410, 413-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).
117 See id. at 411-12.
118 See, e.g., James Rosen, Supreme Court Backs N. C. Chicken Catchers, RALEIGH
NEWS & OBSERVER, Apr. 24, 1996, at 3A (reporting reaction of Tyson Foods, Inc.); Lyle
Denniston, Poultry Workers Have Union Rights, High Court Says, BALT. SUN, Apr. 24,
1996, at 2C (reporting reaction of National Broiler Council).
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Congress offered no critical response, much less any initiative to seek an
override.120 The muted reaction may well reflect that unlike Health Care, the
decision in Holly Farms is of limited practical import. The Court's opinion
applies to a small number of farm-related workers involved in food
processing, but the vast majority of agricultural laborers remain exempt from
coverage under the NLRA. 121
The Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring122 construes a
different federal statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 123 The
question that arose under Title II of the ADA, addressed to public services,
was whether the ADA's proscription on discrimination might in certain
circumstances require that individuals with mental disabilities be shifted
from institutional care to a community-based setting.' 24 The Court's answer
was Yes. Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Ginsburg held that
Congress and the Executive had endorsed a broad meaning for
discrimination, aimed at encouraging integration of individuals with
disabilities into community-based settings.' 25
In Olmstead, two women with mental retardation and histories of mental
illness had been institutionalized for prolonged periods after their treating
psychiatrists concluded their needs could be appropriately met in
community-based programs. 126 The women claimed their unnecessary
institutionalization amounted to unlawful discrimination under Title II of the
119 A handful of legal observers found the majority's position persuasive. See, e.g.,
Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1996, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 519, 542
(1997); Victoria V. Johnson, Did Old MacDonald Have a Farm? Holly Farms Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 295 (1998).
120 Melanie Oberlin, Library Reference Specialist at the Moritz College of Law,
searched Westlaw's Congressional Bills database (CONG-BILL-TXT-ALL) and
Congressional Record database (CR) on October 22, 2008. Two searches were run in
each database: "holly farms"; poultry AND laborer AND "national labor relations." The
searches yielded no relevant results.
121 See Michael H. LeRoy & Wallace Hendricks, Should "Agricultural Laborers"
Continue to Be Excluded From the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 Emory L.J. 489,
494, 507-12 (1999) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions narrowing scope of
agricultural laborer exemption have had minimal impact).
122 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
123 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006)).
124 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587 (1999).
125 See id. at 589-92, 597-603. Justice Ginsburg also discusses the appropriate
remedy in less broad terms. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
126See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 593-94.
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ADA. 12 7 The State of Georgia responded that because it did not provide
community placement to those without disabilities, the exclusion from
community placement of individuals with disabilities could not qualify as
discrimination "by reason of' disability under the statute. 128 Justice Ginsburg
rejected the State's argument, because she was "satisfied that Congress had a
more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination" under the
ADA. 129
Ginsburg relied initially on two background provisions of the ADA to
reveal Congress's more comprehensive approach to discrimination. The
ADA statement of findings described society's tendency to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities, and it identified segregation through
institutionalized settings as a form of discrimination.1 30 The statute's
provision for regulations directed the Attorney General to promulgate rules
implementing Title II, and it specified that these rules must be consistent
with regulations from an earlier federal law mandating that programs and
activities be administered "in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of' individuals with disabilities. 131 Ginsburg noted that the Attorney
General's Title II regulations had followed through in this respect, requiring
state entities to support settings that allow individuals with disabilities to
interact "to the fullest extent possible" with non-disabled persons, while also
specifying that states not be required to make modifications that would
'fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity" they
provide.' 32
For Justice Ginsburg and her majority, these key legislative and
regulatory provisions grounded the Court's conclusion that "unjustified
institutional isolation" of individuals with disabilities does qualify as a form
of discrimination-both because it perpetuates stereotypes about the
capabilities of institutionally confined individuals and because it diminishes
the everyday life activities of those individuals. 133 At the same time-and
127 See id. at 594.
128 See id. Justice Thomas in dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, adopted this position as well. See id. at 615-20 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
129 Id. at 598 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
130 See id. at 588-89 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)).
131 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 591-92 (quoting and amplifying 28 C.F.R.
§ 41.5 1(d)).
132 See id. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A, and 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7)(1998) (emphasis added)).
133 See id. at 599-601.
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writing here only for a pluralityI34-- Ginsburg concluded that the
"fundamental alteration" component of the regulations allows states
considerable leeway in determining when and how to implement
deinstitutionalization. In particular, a state may consider the impact of less
restrictive confinements not only on its mental health budget but also on its
responsibility for serving a diverse mental health population.135
Olmstead has been hailed as a landmark decision, with Justice
Ginsburg's endorsement of the integrationist approach compared favorably
to the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.136 At the same time,
disability rights scholars have expressed concerns both that
deinstitutionalization could be unduly delayed by the discretion given to
states to resist "fundamental alteration" 137 and that overly zealous integration
policies could deprive more seriously disabled individuals of needed
assistance.138
Apart from its implications for disability law, the Olmstead opinion is an
especially clear example of deference to the political branches. Justice
Ginsburg structures her reasoning from the start by establishing how
congressional findings and regulatory formulations inform the expansive
meaning of "discrimination" adopted' by the majority. 139 Similarly, the
deference to the judgment of state actors embraced by the plurality stems
directly from Ginsburg's respect for the Justice Department regulations and
also the Department's position as amicus before the Court.140
134 See id. at 603-06; Justice Stevens did not join this part of Justice Ginsburg's
opinion, although Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Souter did.
135 See id. at 594-95, 604.
136 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in
Expanding "We The People": The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLuM. L. REv. 49, 55
(2004); Mary C. Cerreto, Olmstead: The Brown v. Board of Education for Disability
Rights, 3 LoY. J. PuB. INT. L. 47 (2001); Jefferson D. E. Smith & Steve P. Calandrillo,
Forward to Fundamental Alteration: Addressing ADA Title II Integration Lawsuits After
Olmstead v. L.C., 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695, 698 (2001).
137 See, e.g., Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance Services: "Most
Integrated Setting Appropriate" Requirements and the Independent Living Model of
Long-Term Care, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 17, 35 (2001); The Supreme Court: Leading
Cases, 113 HARV. L. REv. 326, 326-27, 332-36 (1999).
138 See, e.g., Carlos Ball, Looking for Theory in All the Right Places: Feminist and
Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105, 161-
64 (2005); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1415, 1445-48 (2007); see also Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 608-10
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing similar concerns about excessive zeal in
deinstitutionalizing mental patients).
139 See 527 U.S. at 588-93 (Part I of Ginsburg opinion).
14 0 See id. at 603-06 (Part II B of Ginsburg opinion).
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Moreover, Justice Ginsburg when writing for a plurality recognizes the
considerable burdens and costs that might be borne by an additional set of
politically accountable actors-the States.' 41 Her opinion effectively invites
state psychiatrists treating persons with mental disabilities, and state
legislatures funding the range of treatment options, to take the initiative in
making the Court's integrationist approach workable.' 42
There are indications that both the federal executive and the states have
made measured progress in implementing the requirements of Olmstead.143
Whether this progress has been too slow is a subject of continuing review
among mental health professionals as well as lower federal courts. 144
Congress, though, seems reasonably content with the Court's decision. In the
recently enacted ADA Amendments of 2008, Congress overrode as many as
four Supreme Court decisions construing the Act, but offered no criticism of
Olmstead. 145
As with the four Ginsburg opinions in criminal law, the labor and civil
rights opinions discussed in this Part are not offered as empirically
141 See id. at 603 (expressing concern that States not be left "virtually defenseless"
with respect to their mental health budgets); id. at 605 (emphasizing States' need to
balance services for mentally disabled population that requires institutional care with
services for individuals ready for less restrictive settings).
142 See id. at 604-06; Bagenstos, supra note 136, at 58-59.
143 For Federal Executive Branch progress, see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,217, 3
C.F.R. 774 (2001 Compilation Parts 100-02), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (Supp. IV
2005) (requiring inter alia that federal agencies provide coordinated technical assistance
to states and identify specific federal barriers that impede community participation). For
progress at state level, see generally Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Olmstead at
Five: Assessing the Impact, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
June 2004, available at www.kff.org/Medicaid/7105a.cfm. For an excellent brief
overview of Olmstead implementation issues, see Memorandum from John Billington to
Ruth Colker (July 19, 2006) (copy on file with author).
144 See, e.g., Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 143, at 7-27; John V. Jacobi,
Federal Power, Segregation, and Mental Disability, 39 Hous. L. REv. 1231, 1254
(2003). Compare Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that state
engaged in discriminatory administration), and Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335
F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting state's "fundamental alteration" defense) with
Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D. Md. 2001) (approving state's slower
pace toward community integration).
145 The statute in its findings and purposes section rejects the holding and reasoning
of two decisions: Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat.
3553, 3553-54 (2008). The accompanying legislative history identifies four decisions
that the statute was meant to override. See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, part 2, at 8, 10, 20
(2008) (discussing overrides of Sutton; Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); and Toyota Motor); 154 CONG. REC. S7956-57
(daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (same).
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representative samples. Justice Ginsburg has authored workplace law or civil
rights opinions that rely primarily on close textual readings and decline to
seek interpretive guidance from legislative or Executive Branch
commentary. 146 At the same time, she has written additional civil rights
opinions that in methodological terms resemble the trio of cases summarized
above.147 And her attentiveness to legislative history, congressional purpose,
and agency pronouncements is visible in other comprehensive civil
regulatory settings as well. 148
Justice Ginsburg's reliance on contextual resources generated by the
political branches stands in marked contrast to her interpretive stance in the
four criminal law cases discussed in Part I. She seems far less comfortable
with a close textual reading, and she eschews reliance on substantive canons,
a reliance that was central when she construed federal criminal statutes. One
could argue that Ginsburg's choice of interpretive resources in both areas is
primarily a function of her preferred outcomes. On this account, her use of
textual analysis and substantive canons could be viewed as enabling the
Court to deflect a conservative Congress on criminal cases, while her use of
legislative history and agency deference allows the Court to support a liberal
Congress on labor and civil rights decisions.' 49 But as noted earlier, this
ideological account is at best incomplete. In the criminal law decisions,
Justice Ginsburg's support for white collar as well as street crime defendants
does not align her with traditionally liberal Justices.1 50 Additionally, her
opinion construing the ADA is more cautious than some disability rights
advocates would have wanted.151
It seems likely that institutional factors have helped shape Ginsburg's
interpretive approach at least as much as traditionally ideological
considerations. Her close attention to legislative history and agency guidance
in the areas of labor relations and civil rights reflects her view that the courts
have a distinctly more respectful role to play when construing complex
regulatory schemes like the NLRA or the ADA. Rather than pushing
146 See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 451-54 (2003)
(dissenting opinion); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (majority opinion).
147 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643-61 (2007)
(dissenting opinion); Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002).
148 See, e.g., Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004)
(environmental law); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (securities law);
Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264 (1996) (banking law).
149 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 78, 92-98.
150 See supra note 81 (discussing Ginsburg opinions in Ratziaf and Muscarello); see
also supra note 80, and accompanying text (discussing how Ginsburg opinions reviewed
here differ from broader Court trends).
151 See supra text accompanying note 137.
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Congress to clarify its policy preferences, Justice Ginsburg examines
legislative history in an effort to understand those policy preferences, to
apply in spirit as well as letter the legislative bargain or "deal" that was
struck. Similarly, rather than being suspicious of Executive Branch
initiatives, Ginsburg presumptively regards agency regulatory efforts as
attempts to implement or even update Congress's legislative judgments.
One way to understand and perhaps explain Justice Ginsburg's two quite
divergent methodological perspectives is by exploring institutional
considerations in more depth, specifically the Court's shifting role as an
interstitial actor.
III. THE JUDICIAL VOICE AND INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
A. The Court's Interdependent Interpretive Role
As a starting point, Justice Ginsburg's scholarly reflections on the role of
the judiciary shed some light on her eclectic approach to statutory
interpretation. While serving on the D.C. Circuit, Ginsburg delivered the
Madison Lecture at NYU Law School. 152 Her remarks focused on the
potential for judicial missteps in constitutional decision-making, but they
also resonate with respect to the judicial function when construing statutes.
Judge Ginsburg was mindful that the judicial role in shaping legal
doctrine is an interdependent one: 153 she emphasized that in order to be
effective, judges should "engag[e] in a dialogue with, not a diatribe against,
co-equal departments of government .... ,,154 Ginsburg recognized that the
Court must at times "step ahead of the political branches in pursuit of a
constitutional precept,"' 155  and more broadly that many judicial
interpretations are aptly characterized as a form of legislating. 156 But she
cautioned courts to engage in such legislating only on an interstitial basis,
through "[m]easured motions" and again as part of a "dialogue with other
organs of government .... ,,157
Six years earlier, in her Roth Lecture at University of Southern
California Law School, Judge Ginsburg addressed the costs of legislative
missteps, voicing concern that Congress was effectively requiring the federal
152 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185
(1992).
153 See id. at 1198.
154 Id. at 1186.
155 See id. at 1206 (citing with approval Brown v. Board of Education).
156 See id. at 1198.
157 Id.
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courts to engage in too much legislating. 158 Her plea was for Congress to
draft more carefully and to review and revise its statutory work product so
that courts did not have to struggle regularly to create consistency or fill
gaps. 159 Borrowing from Judge Friendly's proposal in an earlier era,
Ginsburg suggested that Congress create an internal "second look"
mechanism for clarifying certain ambiguities or omissions as soon as courts
identify them. 160 She added that such statutory repairs could often be
undertaken at no political cost, as many drafting defects lack partisan
implications.' 6 1
The Ginsburg-Friendly proposal for a structure of corrective lawmaking
involves two implicit assumptions that are at least debatable. The first is that
Congress and the courts do--or should-value equally the goal of achieving
clarity in statutory text.' 62 The second is that statutory corrections can be
secured on a systemic basis without imposing considerable opportunity costs
on Congress.' 63 Even assuming, however, that Congress were interested in
legislating some clarifications following lower court decisions, and that such
clarifications could be achieved at little partisan or institutional cost, it is far
from clear that clarifications responding to Supreme Court decisions would
fall routinely into this category. The prospect of political salience-if not
controversy-is surely present with respect to these decisions, as they often
trigger high-profile partisan and ideological differences among members of
Congress.
In addition, as Judge Friendly recognized, there may be good reason for
Congress to frame some statutes in expansive, albeit ambiguous terms.
158 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 995
(1986).
159 See id. at 995-96, 1000-01.
160 See id. at 1011-17 (building on recommendations from Henry J. Friendly, The
Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can 't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
787 (1963)).
161 See Ginsburg, supra note 158, at 1013.
162 See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting:
A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 590-604 (2002) (describing view of
legislators and their key staff that drafting text involves a contextualized and intensely
pressured search for consensus, with canons and other rules that promote clarity and
predictability playing a peripheral role); Breyer, supra note 2, at 870-71 (questioning
whether legislators are aided by knowledge that court-produced canons may govern
future legislation, especially given a less-than-efficient legislative process characterized
by decentralized and partisan bargaining).
163 See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 20-40 (1994)
(discussing institutional costs to Congress of having to clarify textual ambiguities, and
the role of legislative history in helping to minimize those costs).
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Friendly referred with approval to federal labor laws having left courts and
agencies "free to perform their historic role of formulating more definite
standards within the general mandate."' 164 Legislative rules and definitions
often seek to set forth complex regulatory ideas or concepts, such as the
contours of an employer-employee relationship or what constitutes unlawful
discrimination. Precisely because "words are treacherous for the transmission
of [such] ideas,"'165 rules and definitions that are too specific or exhaustive
are likely to end up covering both more and less than their congressional
authors sought to address. They also are likely-as Judge Friendly
intimated-to constrain agencies, courts, and private parties in their ability to
adjust to circumstances unforeseen or unforeseeable at time of enactment. 166
Notwithstanding pragmatic concerns about the Ginsburg-Friendly
approach, the two Ginsburg lectures reveal a firm belief that federal courts
should strive to interact with the political branches as part of fulfilling their
basic interpretive role. This role inevitably will include both creative judicial
constructions and invitations to Congress to draft with greater clarity. But in
undertaking such initiatives, Ginsburg counsels a healthy dose of humility:
courts should make clear their interest in and commitment to an ongoing
conversation with Congress and the Executive. Against this background, it is
worth examining why Justice Ginsburg's dialogue with Congress develops
differently in these two subject areas, why her judicial voice is more robust
and proactive on matters of criminal law interpretation than on workplace
law disputes.
B. Institutional Comity and Congressional Overrides
Conventional wisdom suggests that given its power to correct judicial
mistakes, "[i]n the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the
master." 167 The growth of committee staffs, along with Congress's
heightened mistrust of the other branches, has led to greater legislative
scrutiny of federal court decisions. 168 At the Supreme Court level,
congressional overrides increased substantially in the years from 1974 to
164 Friendly, supra note 160, at 792.
165 Douglas, supra note 1, at 19.
166 See generally Brudney, supra note 163, at 29.
167 W. Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
1 6 8 See JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESs RELATIONS 43 (2004). See generally Richard
Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the Supreme Court, 8
J.L. & POL. 143, 199-203 (1991).
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1990,169 and there is no suggestion that Congress's attentiveness has
diminished in the past two decades.17 0
Overrides of the Court's criminal law decisions have been especially
frequent since the 1960s.171 Political scientists and legal scholars identify
several contributing factors in the criminal law area. The Court may be
reluctant to sustain criminal convictions due to considerations of notice and
fairness that raise constitutionally related policy concerns, yet the Court's
concerns can be addressed by sufficiently clear statutory text. 172 In addition,
the fact that the Justice Department was the losing party before the Court
means that members of Congress often have the Executive Branch as a
powerful ally or even initiator of override proposals. 173 Relatedly, the Court
169 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991) (reporting data indicating that Congress
overrode 5.7 Court decisions on average for each Congress from 1967-1974, but 12.6
Court decisions per Congress from 1975-1990).
170 See, e.g., supra note 36 and note 77 and accompanying text (discussing 1994 and
1998 overrides of criminal law decisions); supra note 145 and accompanying text
(discussing 2008 override of four civil rights decisions). See generally Lori Hausegger &
Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory
Interpretation, in GREAT THEATRE: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 1990s 224, 228
(Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. Patterson eds., 1998) (discussing overrides through
1996).
171 See Eskridge, supra note 169, at 344-45 (reporting that 15% of congressional
overrides from 1967-1990 involved criminal law, and the next highest subject matters
addressed-antitrust and civil rights-were at only 9% while income tax was at 7%);
Nancy C. Staudt et al., Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional Oversight of
Supreme Court Tax Cases 1954-2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1354 (2007) (reporting
that of 279 Supreme Court tax decisions from 1954 to 2004, 8% were overridden); see
also EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 358 (2008) (suggesting that Eskridge
study actually understates frequency of Court's criminal law overrides). But cf Ruth
Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
14 n.49 (2007) (suggesting that Eskridge study may overstate frequency of overrides
generally during 1967-90 period).
172 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 600
(discussing rule of lenity); Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the
Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 202-03 (same); cf Eskridge, supra note
169, at 389 (discussing Court's institutional signaling by use of constitutionally inspired
clear statement rules). See generally Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting
Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation,
43 AM. J. POL. SCi. 162 (1999).
173 See BARNES, supra note 168, at 163--64 (finding that Congress more likely to
override if federal government has direct stake in reversing outcome); Hausegger &
Baum, supra note 170, at 240-42 (fmding override more than twice as likely when
United States was a party on losing side). Although these findings are tempered if the
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is more likely to issue invitations to Congress in subject areas such as
criminal law where it expects overrides to be relatively frequent. 174 This is at
least partly a matter of institutional self-protection. When the Court
concludes based on its faithful construction of the statute that a conviction
must be reversed, the Justices may still want to minimize criticism from
legislators-and also the public and the media-by in effect hedging their
bets and shifting ultimate responsibility to Congress to fix the problem. 175
Each of these factors is relevant when considering Justice Ginsburg's
proactive approach to construing criminal statutes. In her trio of criminal law
majorities, Ginsburg worries about the risk that individuals will be punished
for conduct that lacked a criminal motive, 176 or for actions they could not
reasonably anticipate were prohibited by Congress, 177 especially when such
actions traditionally had been regulated only by the states and state
governments are not parties to the disputes before the Court. 178 These
constitutionally grounded concerns involving notice, fairness, and federalism
lead Ginsburg to impose on Congress the burden of issuing clearer directives,
a burden she further justifies in her Muscarello dissent. 179 At the same time,
Justice Ginsburg understands from her initial Term on the Court, if not
earlier, that Congress-assisted by the Justice Department-is quite prepared
to assume this burden with respect to criminal statutes. Her suggestions that
Congress should speak more clearly are made knowing that Congress has the
will to act promptly and decisively on criminal law matters. When inviting
Congress to respond, Justice Ginsburg opts for dialogue over diatribe.
Reversing criminal convictions can make the Court unpopular with the
Court's opinion is unanimous, id. at 241, the Court's strategic institutional concerns still
tend to come into play.
174 See Hausegger & Baum, supra note 172, at 167; see also ELHAUGE, supra note
171, at 168-69 (contending that lenity-based narrowing interpretations of criminal
statutes are especially likely to be corrected by overrides because prosecutors and other
members of anti-criminal lobbying groups are regularly involved in drafting and have
ready access to legislative agenda); Joseph Ignagni & James Meemik, Explaining
Congressional Attempts to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions, 47 POL. RES. Q. 353, 357
(1994) (contending that members feel encouraged to seek overrides of Court decisions on
which there are public indications of displeasure).
175 See Hausegger & Baum, supra note 172, at 172-73; see also ELHAUGE, supra
note 171, at 256 (relying on Hausegger & Baum findings to contend that when Court
concludes plain meaning requires reversal of conviction, it may also invite override to
signal its possible or likely policy disagreement with conclusion reached).
176 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Ratzlaj).
177 See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (discussing Cleveland).
178 See supra notes 45-46 and 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing Cleveland
and Jones).
179 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing Muscarello).
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public as well as the political branches. By signaling to Congress that it may
have the last word, Ginsburg respects the legislature's institutional role while
also diminishing prospects that the Court will suffer any lasting reputational
damage. 180
The institutional backdrop to Justice Ginsburg's two labor law opinions
is rather different. Unlike Supreme Court criminal law cases, overrides of the
Court's labor law decisions are virtually nonexistent. 181 The contrast is part
of a larger track record: Congress has been immobilized with respect to the
NLRA for half a century. 182 Given this prolonged period of interest group
gridlock and legislative paralysis, the Court can operate without meaningful
risk or threat of override. Indeed, if a majority opinion did invite Congress to
speak more clearly on an NLRA interpretive issue, the Court might well be
viewed as mocking Congress's inability to revisit the statute.
That the Court is able to operate more freely on NLRA matters absent
the shadow of an override does not mean it ought to do so. The NLRA was
enacted as a comprehensive regulatory scheme, aimed at significantly
altering the pre-existing legal landscape of rights and duties.183 The 1935 Act
180 Professor Elhauge in his recent book suggests that the Rule of Lenity and other
canons favoring the politically powerless are best understood as preference-eliciting
default rules to address otherwise unresolved statutory ambiguity. See ELHAUGE, supra
note 171, at 151-81, 185-87. Elhauge, however, presents such canons as a third-best
option, to be invoked as a tiebreaker only if there are no agency decisions from which to
infer current enactable preferences and no legislative history allowing for estimation of
enactor preferences. See id. at 9-12; Susan Phillips Read, Statutory Resolution, 12 GREEN
BAG 2D 85, 86-89 (2008). Further, Elhauge regards the canon against preemption of state
law as a supplemental default rule of even lower priority, to be invoked in support of
federalism as a substantive value in cases where federally enactable preferences can be
neither reliably estimated nor practically elicited. See ELHAUGE, supra at 229-32.
Justice Ginsburg is far more proactive and determined when invoking both the Rule
of Lenity and the anti-preemption canon in a criminal setting. In her three majority
opinions, Ginsburg concludes that the text is clear but she nonetheless makes use of the
canons to amplify her holding from policy and strategic standpoints. In relying on the two
canons, Ginsburg discounts contrary legislative history in her five-to-four majority and
she develops them as additional justifications in her two unanimous majorities. Further,
in Muscarello, her dissent takes direct issue with the notion of lenity as a tiebreaker,
insisting that unless legislative history and Executive Branch construction establish the
pro-prosecution statutory reading as unambiguously correct, courts are bound to rule for
the criminal defendant.
181 See Eskridge, supra note 169, at 344.
182 See generally James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain
Future, 26 CoMP. LAB. L & POL'Y J. 221, 228 (2005); Cynthia L. Estlund, The
Ossification ofAmerican LaborLaw, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1535, 1540-43 (2002).
18 3 See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
POLICY 129-39 (1950); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 226-29 (1982); Leon
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and its 1947 and 1959 amendments also constitute a complex series of
legislative bargains that the business community and organized labor were
intimately involved in negotiating. 184 As judges and scholars recognize with
respect to regulatory schemes in general, the legislative history
accompanying such bargains can be a valuable resource to help explain
various details and specific applications. 185 By the same token, if courts
ignore or discount relevant legislative history, they may-even if
inadvertently-be tampering with or undoing certain aspects of the deals that
were made. The regulatory structure enacted pursuant to these deals will
often have survived the erosion of political coalitions and popular intensity
that initially produced them. But if Congress has not repealed, modified, or
even specifically addressed the text framing the legislative bargains, then the
proper interdependent role for courts may be to pay close attention to what
Congress thought it was doing when it enacted the text in question. 186
A further element of interstitial judicial activity in this setting is
attentiveness to interpretations by the executive agency charged with
implementing the regulatory scheme. An agency like the NLRB is not
responsible for the larger legal landscape; its mission is fidelity to the Act
that created it. The Board's specialized provenance and limited jurisdiction
should tend to make it more loyal to the Act's original purposes and intent
than many federal judges, for whom there may be pressure to readjust the
H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT: AFrER TEN YEARS 5-18
(Louis G. Silverburg ed., 1945).
184 See generally BERNsTEiN, supra note 183 (discussing 1935 Act); Keyserling,
supra note 183 (same); Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act 1947, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1, 5-19 (1947) (discussing 1947 Act); Archibald
Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L.
REv. 257, 258-60 (1959) (discussing 1959 Act).
185 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250-63 (1994) (relying on
legislative history to explain compromise over retroactivity provisions of 1991 Civil
Rights Act); Jackson Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 24-29
(1982) (relying on legislative history to explain retention of state labor law provisions in
1964 Urban Mass Transportation Act); Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., 416 U.S. 653, 659-
62 (1974) (using legislative history to explain exemption of supervisors from state law
coverage under NLRA). See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative
History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 858-60 (1992); McNollgast,
Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO.
L.J. 705, 724-27 (1992); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices'Reliance
on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 117, 146-53, 157-60 (2008).
186 See James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and
the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 1030-34 (1996); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18
J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-79 (1975).
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original congressional priorities of an older statute like the NLRA in order to
accommodate extrinsic changes in the regulated marketplace. 187 The Board
will at times be deemed to have construed the original purposes in an
arbitrary manner or even to have acted in something akin to bad faith.1 88 But
more often, especially when the Board's interpretation reinforces or
comports with the relevant legislative history, the Court's most constructive
role in dialogic terms may well be to follow the lead of the two other
branches.
This inquisitive yet ultimately deferential stance toward contextual
resources produced by Congress and the Executive is consistent with Justice
Ginsburg's interpretive approach in her NLRA opinions. In both Health Care
and Holly Farms, she places heavy reliance on legislative history and agency
guidance. In neither case does Ginsburg hint at the possibility of inviting a
congressional response to the Court's interpretation, even the majority's
textualist opinion in Health Care from which she strongly dissents. 189 To be
sure, the federal government is on the losing side in Health Care as it was in
Ratzlaf Cleveland, and Jones. But the NLRB is not a serious legislative
player the way the Justice Department is on criminal law matters. And
Congress in the mid 1990s-especially a newly elected Republican
Congress-is extremely unlikely to respond legislatively after failing to
revisit the NLRA since 1959. In these circumstances, Ginsburg views the
Court's role as being deferential rather than proactive toward the regulatory
scheme Congress enacted decades earlier. Her majority as well as her dissent
suggest that the Court's interdependence in this setting pushes toward its
focusing on legislative history and agency guidance, not on judicially
promulgated assets like ordinary meaning or the canons.
1 87 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
81-105 (1994) (describing how federal courts between 1877 and 1938 constructed the
authority to impose labor injunctions from various extrinsic developments in federal
law); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
1479, 1488-93, 1516 (1987) (describing how Supreme Court in Weber validated
affirmative action by relying on "the legal culture's rethinking of the concept of
discrimination" between 1964 and 1979); see also Brudney, supra note 186, at 1002-09,
1023-28 (discussing how appellate courts from 1986-1993 acted to restrict bargaining
orders out of respect for individual employee rights); Terry A. Bethel & Catherine A.
Melfi, Judicial Enforcement of NLRB Bargaining Orders: What Influences the Courts?,
22 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 139, 161-62, 173-75 (1988) (reporting similarly high non-
enforcement rates for bargaining orders in 1970s and early 1980s).
188 See generally Brudney, supra note 182, at 221-22, 224-26 (discussing barrage
of criticism for recent Board decisions weakening employees' rights to engage in
organizing and collective bargaining under NLRA).
189 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion discounts legislative history and the
agency's position as Ginsburg did in her criminal law trilogy, but he too eschews any
whisper of an invitation to Congress to revisit the "supervisor" issue.
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The final Ginsburg opinion, involving the ADA, reveals a slightly
different approach to her goal of recognizing institutional interdependence.
Unlike the situation with the NLRA, Congress does revisit our national civil
rights laws-notably Title VII and the ADEA-on a periodic basis.' 90 At the
same time, congressional overrides of Supreme Court civil rights decisions
are not as frequent or piecemeal as has occurred in the criminal law area.191
Apart from Olmstead, the Court in 1999 issued several other controversial
decisions applying the ADA. 192 Despite considerable criticism of those Court
decisions and of the trend in lower court cases heavily disfavoring ADA
plaintiffs, 193 Congress did not revisit the ADA at all until 2008, eighteen
years after its enactment. 194
190 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (Title VII); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat.
2076 (Title VII); Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (ADEA); Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (ADEA); Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (ADEA); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Title VII).
191 See Eskridge, supra note 169, at 344-45 (reporting that between 1967 and 1990,
Congress overrode eighteen criminal law decisions and eleven civil rights decisions).
Congress typically overrode single criminal law decisions in a statute during this period.;
See, e.g., Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3103, 104 Stat. 4789, 4916
(overriding Penn. Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990)); Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988)
(overriding McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)); Prescription Drug Mktg. Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, § 4, 102 Stat. 95, 96 (1988) (overriding United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)); Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-654, § 2, 100 Stat.
3660, 3660-63 (1986) (overriding Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946)). By
contrast, the 1991 Civil Rights Act and 2008 Americans with Disabilities Act
amendments are instances of more systemic responses. See infra note 207; supra note
145 & accompanying text. But see infra text accompanying notes 206 and 208
(discussing single-case overrides amending Title VII in 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination
Act and 2009 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, plus Congress's override response in 1987
Civil Rights Restoration Act).
192 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S.
516 (1999); Albertson's v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
193 See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under
the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REv. 321 (2000) (critical of Supreme
Court decisions); Ruth Colker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 107-110 (1999) (reporting and discussing
trend in lower court decisions).
194 See Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Barry, & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, 13 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 195-99 (2008). Congressional action on civil
rights has been less frequent since the early 1990s, because Republicans controlled one or
both chambers between 1994 and 2006.
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More broadly, the presence or absence of partisan divisions is a key
difference between override potential in civil rights and criminal law.
Congress is prepared to override criminal law decisions on an
overwhelmingly bipartisan basis and without undue debate or delay. 195 By
contrast, Congress's overrides of civil rights decisions are often closely
contested and typically take considerably longer to accomplish.196
When Ginsburg wrote her Olmstead majority, she had no reason to
anticipate a congressional capacity to override in the near future. In this
setting, Ginsburg's opinion adopted an expansively purposive view of the
ADA's key concept-discrimination. Her interpretation of the broadly
remedial provision was informed by how she believed Congress and the
Justice Department meant for it to apply to a population for whom
segregation was a strong, continuing reality. Although Ginsburg could have
adhered to the more formalistic and literal meaning of discrimination
195 See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (overriding McNally) (introduced in
House Aug. 11, 1988; passed House 375-30 and Senate 87-3; signed by President Nov.
18, 1988), Library of Congress, THOMAS, Search Bill Summary & Status for 100th
Congress, H.R. 5210, http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/100search.html (search "H.R. 5210," then
click on "Major Congressional Actions") (last visited Mar. 4, 2009); Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (overriding Ratzla) (introduced
in House Nov. 9, 1993 and approved by Voice Vote twelve days later; discharged from
Senate Banking Committee by unanimous consent on Mar. 17, 1994, and passed Senate
by unanimous consent on same day), Library of Congress, THOMAS, Search Bill
Summary & Status for 103d Congress, H.R. 3474, http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/
103search.html (search "H.R. 3474," then click on "Major Congressional Actions") (last
visited Mar. 4, 2009).
196 See, e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (overriding Grove City)
(introduced Feb. 1987; enacted over President Reagan's veto in Mar. 1988), Library of
Congress, THOMAS, Search Bill Summary & Status for the 100th Congress, S. 557,
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/I00search.html (search "S. 557") (last visited Mar. 23, 2009);
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (overriding Belts) (introduced Aug. 1989;
enacted October 1990 following bipartisan Senate Floor compromise and withdrawal of
President Bush's opposition), Library of Congress, THOMAS, Search Bill Summary &
Status for the 101st Congress, S. 1511, http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/101 search.html (search
"older workers benefit protection," then click on "S. 1511") (last visited Mar. 23, 2009);
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (overriding nine Supreme Court decisions) (introduced in Feb.
1990; approved by Congress but vetoed by President Bush in October 1990, veto
sustained in Senate 66-34; re-introduced following extensive compromise negotiations in
Sept. 1991 and became law in Nov. 1991), Library of Congress, THOMAS, Search Bill
Summary & Status for the 102d Congress, S. 1745,
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/102search.html (search "S. 1745") (last visited Mar. 23, 2009)
and Library of Congress, THOMAS, Search Bill Summary & Status for the 101st
Congress, S. 2104, http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/101search.html (search "Civil Rights Act,"
then click on "S. 2104") (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
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advocated by the dissent, 197 such an approach would have been-for her-an
assertion of judicial independence rather than interdependence.
At the same time, Ginsburg in Olmstead did not go as far as she could
have, or as some disability rights advocates may have wished she had. 198 Her
hesitation was tied directly to her view that decisions about the speed and
scope of deinstitutionalization carried complex and unforeseeable
consequences, and the Court needed to give state governments ample
discretion to plan for those consequences.' 99 Once again, Justice Ginsburg's
tempered approach reflects a sensitivity to the Court's interstitial role,
including its need to be respectful of the political process even as the Court
directed that new steps be taken by key political actors.
C. Theoretical Coherence and Practical Complexity
There is one further notable connection between Justice Ginsburg's
eclectic approach to statutory interpretation and her sensitivity to the
vicissitudes of the legislative process. Recent empirical studies report that the
Court's reliance on textualist assets such as ordinary meaning analysis and
the canons is more likely to trigger overrides than its reliance on
intentionalist assets such as legislative history or purpose.200 The finding that
197 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581, 615-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that term
"discrimination" does not encompass disparate treatment among members of same
protected class, but only applies to differential treatment between individuals inside
versus outside protected class).
198 See, e.g., Leading Cases, supra note 137, at 326-27, 332-36 (criticizing
Ginsburg's opinion for undue deference to state psychiatrists); Batavia, supra note 137, at
35 (expressing concern over possible delay in deinstitutionalization due to discretion
vested in states).
199 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603-06. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Their
Promises of Paradise": Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional "Least
Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOus. L. REv. 999,
1036-37 (2000); Comment, Olmstead v. L.C.-Deinstitutionalization and Community
Integration: An Awakening of the Nation's Conscience?, 58 MERCER L. REv. 1381,
1398-99 (2007).
200 See Eskridge, supra note 169, at 347-48 (reporting that nearly half the overrides
from 1967 to 1990 address decisions in which the Court's primary reasoning was based
on plain meaning or canons of construction, whereas overrides of decisions based on
statutory purpose are rare); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word:
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 425,
448 (1992) (reporting that a disproportionate number of decisions between 1968 and
1988 that were overridden by Congress relied on a plain meaning analysis); see also
Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism 's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53
VAND. L. REv. 887, 900-910 (2000) (reporting that a disproportionate number of federal
court decisions interpreting bankruptcy statute from 1979 to 1998 that were overridden
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a high proportion of these overrides now occur within a short period
following the Court's decision 201 lends some credence to the argument that
the Court's textualist and canon-centered approach may be disguising an
effort to undermine rather than respect the will of Congress.20 2
The Ginsburg opinions reviewed in this Article suggest that the picture is
more complicated. Speaking for some liberal and some conservative
members of the Court,203 Ginsburg invokes judicially generated resources-
the canons and plain meaning analysis-when construing criminal statutes;
in doing so she invites further deliberation and perhaps ultimately rejection
from Congress. By contrast, speaking for a group of mostly liberal
Justices, 204 Ginsburg goes beyond textualism and relies on intentionalist
resources-legislative history and agency deference-when construing labor
and civil rights statutes that are less likely candidates for congressional
override.
Unlike some of her colleagues on the Court, Justice Ginsburg's
interpretive stance does not reflect a unified doctrinal approach to the use of
interpretive resources. 20 5 Instead, she seems determined to cast the Court's
role in institutional terms, as an interpreter that engages in varying ways with
by Congress relied on textualist method). See generally FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 82 (2009) (summarizing findings from
various studies).
201 See Eskridge, supra note 169, at 450-55 (reporting that 62% of overrides
between 1987 and 1990 occurred within two years of Court's decision, whereas 44% of
overrides between 1982 and 1986, and 32% of overrides between 1967 and 1981, were
within two years of Court's decision).
202 See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn? Should
Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 561, 562 (1992); Steven R.
Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 37
(1991); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrides the Court, 79 CAL. L.
REv. 729 (1991); see also Brudney, supra note 163, at 47 n. 188 (observing that a number
of congressional overrides in late 1970s and 1980s occurred promptly enough to allow
for ongoing participation by key members of Congress).
203 See supra note 81 (discussing mixed liberal and conservative support for
Ginsburg's opinions in two 5-4 criminal law decisions, and support from all liberals and
conservatives for Ginsburg's two unanimous opinions).
204 In the Holly Farms and Olmstead majorities, Ginsburg's opinions are joined by
Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens. She also was joined by Justice O'Connor in
Olmstead and by Justice Kennedy in Holly Farms. The Ginsburg dissent in Health Care
was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Blackmun.
205 See SCALIA, supra note 2 (advocating textualism); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY 85-101 (2005) (advocating pragmatism); W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83, 112-16 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating intentionalism); Bank
One Chi. N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-78 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (same).
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the two other branches. In Ginsburg's view, the Court should be more activist
in promoting clarity and predictability-even at the risk of frustrating
Congress's likely purpose-when such clarity is important for
constitutionally informed policy reasons and also is deemed relatively easy
for Congress to achieve. On the other hand, the Court should be less willing
to insist on clarity and predictability-and more committed to searching for
and deferring to legislative intent-when the policy issues were resolved
through complex regulatory bargains negotiated by experienced political
actors on both sides. The Ginsburg approach may not be captured in a
pristine interpretive theory, but it does offer the outline for a coherent
interpretive framework.
At the same time, the approach ascribed to Justice Ginsburg has certain
rough edges, perhaps too readily smoothed over in this Article. Legislative
bargains negotiated by sophisticated players in the civil rights area are not
always so resistant to congressional updating. The Court's Title VII cases
may be less amenable to override than its criminal law decisions, but the
Justices' interpretations of Title VII draw regular congressional interest, and
these interpretations have led to overrides on a piecemeal20 6 as well as a
systemic20 7 basis. Indeed, Congress in recent months overrode the Court's
Ledbetter decision and in doing so responded to an impassioned Ginsburg
dissent inviting just such action.20 8 Congress has shown a willingness to
override the Court on individual ADEA decisions as well. 20 9
It may be that over time, the ADA will come to resemble other major
civil rights statutes such as Title VII and the ADEA more than the NLRA in
terms of Congress's capacity to correct or override Supreme Court decisions
with which it disagrees. Stepping back, Congress seems inclined to initiate
206 See 1987 Civil Rights Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687) (overriding Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984)); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) (overriding Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976)).
207 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (overriding
nine Supreme Court decisions issued from 1988 to 1990).
208 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009);
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). It is not clear if Ginsburg anticipated Congress would act to override during
the George W. Bush presidency or only when the White House was occupied by a
Democrat. Either way, she evidently viewed the prospect of an override as far more likely
with respect to this civil rights statute than under the NLRA.
209 See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(1990) (overriding Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat.
189 (overriding United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977)).
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override efforts in civil rights law more regularly than it does in labor
relations (although less regularly than it does in criminal law). The difference
between civil rights and labor relations reflects a stronger and more
continuous public interest in civil rights issues as well as a more favorable
political dynamic for interest groups promoting civil rights reforms.210 The
Ginsburg interpretive framework may therefore point toward a continuum
rather than a set of bright line distinctions. It is hard to argue that Justice
Ginsburg would embrace such an adjustment, as this Article sets forth a
framework she herself has not proposed. But the possibility of amplifying her
approach may lead to a more open dialogue between the Justice and the legal
academy regarding how best to set forth a coherent interpretive theory based
on the institutional considerations she clearly values.
CONCLUSION
Justice Ginsburg's bottom line in the statutory decisions I have analyzed
can fairly be characterized as liberal. This Article has argued, however, that
Ginsburg's interpretive reasoning is in fact more nuanced and complex in
engaging a distinct set of non-doctrinal considerations. Although the Justice
has not articulated a second-order theory to explain differences in her
interpretive approach, certain patterns do emerge. The seven opinions
discussed here suggest that Ginsburg believes the Court should approach
statutory cases with an eye toward fostering institutional dialogue and inter-
branch sensitivity, values the Justice has identified as important in her non-
judicial writings.
Judicial reasoning that attends to considerations of institutional comity is
not without risks. Heightened sensitivity to the prospects for future
congressional override may subject the Court to criticism that it has acted
with insufficient regard for what the enacting Congress meant to
accomplish.211 At the same time, a cramped interpretation of prior
2 10 See JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM 2-3, 70-71, 121 (1999)
(discussing rising political influence of civil rights organizations as well as other liberal
"citizen groups" since 1960s, and shift in agenda of U.S. politics away from traditionally
material issues); STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE
AMERICAN WORKER 241-45 (2008) (discussing decline of labor unions since 1950s in
terms of power, prestige, and public consciousness); Brudney, supra note 182, at 227-29
(contrasting Congress's inability to enact labor law reform with its continuing interest in
updating civil rights statutes).
211 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 27, at 83-87 (arguing that Court acted
strategically in setting civil rights policy in 1970s); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the
1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1417, 1428-29, 1499-
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congressional override text may create lingering "shadow precedents" that
unduly confine what the correcting Congress intended to address. 212
Justice Ginsburg's institutional approach arguably strives to minimize
these two risks. By inviting Congress to respond to her text-and-canon-
centered criminal law opinions, she maintains a respectful dialogue in
anticipation of possible overrides. By invoking legislative history and
Executive Branch guidance in her labor and civil rights opinions, she
expresses a supportive and deferential position toward the political
branches. 213 Although Justice Ginsburg speaks less explicitly and at a lower
decibel level on matters of statutory interpretation than some of her
colleagues, her eclectic orientation may well prove instructive for judges who
wish to eschew a more uniform or monolithic approach to resolving statutory
disputes.
1525 (2003) (same); Davies, supra note 35, at 377-81 (arguing that Court acted
strategically in ignoring clear Congressional preference in criminal law).
212 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 627 n.2, 652-54 (dispute between majority and
dissent on scope of Congress's 1991 override of Lorance v. AT&T, 490 U.S. 900 (1989));
S. Rep. No. 101-263, at 29 (1990) (chastising Court decision in Betts for its restrictive
interpretation of 1978 congressional override); Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents
and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 511 (2009).
213 On occasion, Justice Ginsburg confronts a statutory controversy that implicates
both criminal law and civil rights-related considerations. In United States v. Hayes, 129
S. Ct. 1079 (2009), following a 1994 conviction for battery against his spouse,
respondent was found in possession of a rifle and was indicted in 2005 for violation of a
1996 amendment to the federal Gun Control Act. Ginsburg's majority opinion took a pro-
government view as to the scope of prohibited conduct in the context of a crime
involving violence against women. The Court held that when Congress prohibited
possession of firearms by persons convicted of "a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence," it did not make a domestic relationship a defining element of the predicate
offense. See id. at 1084-89.
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